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Abstract
We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with
regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual “satisfactions”.
Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a gener-
alized Marriage Problem, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by
a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the
way consumers’ information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products
in a competitive market.
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1 Marriage model as a market metaphor
The Marriage Problem [1] describes a system where two classes of N players,
that we shall often call men and women, can be matched pairwise to their mu-
tual benefit. In different contexts players could be producers and consumers,
employers and job seekers or resources and activities in general. In fact, while
the metaphorical model of marriages between men and women is suggestive,
the importance of studying matching models lies, for us, in their broad im-
plications in economic and social contexts. The fundamental premise is that
there are many mutually beneficial relations out there to be found, like the
one linking consumers with specific wishes to firms with suitable products.
Mutually beneficial does not imply equally beneficial: previous work shows
that, whoever processes more information, can in general reap more benefits
[2].
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In this work we study further the matching model in some detail. In particular,
we want to compare the matchmaker mediated matches (global optimum)
with those obtained through the self-searching mode. The latter can be Nash
equilibria [3] or satisficingmatches, according to the definition of H. Simon [4].
He claims that people face uncertainty about the future and costs in acquiring
information in the present. Sometimes information is simply unavailable. The
best agents can do, with partial information and limited research capability, is
setting an aspiration level which, if achieved, they will be happy enough with.
Even if agents were “maximizers” of some utility function, partial information
would still prevent potential optimal partners from finding each other. Our
analysis allows us to determine how good are the approximations agents must
be content with, in the absence of complete information. This is particularly
relevant in economic relations, notably in the law of Supply and Demand. Neo-
classical economics generally assumes perfect information is available, leading
to optimal solutions. More recent researches, like the one conducted by Ak-
erlof [5], suggest that in extreme cases of asymmetric information, potentially
beneficial transactions may fail to materialize.
However, when a transaction is still realized, even with limited information,
standard economics literature does not address the problem of determining
how far from the optimum it falls. We try here, as it has previously been done
in a different context [6], to quantify the dependence of this distance from the
amount of available information. Our approach offers an open-ended research
agenda, aiming to give a micro detailed description of macroscopic matchings
[7].
2 Average satisfaction in matching games
Let us now formalize the model. We start with 2N players, N men and N
women, who are to be matched. Each player is been assigned his/her list of
preferred partners. The lists are drawn at random and are independent from
one another. If man m marries woman w we attribute him an energy equal
to the ranking of w in m’s list. Let us define the matrices f (for women) and
h (for men), such that the element f(w,m) denotes the rank of man m in
w’s list and h(m,w) the rank of woman w in m’s list. The average energy per
person in a given matching is defined by
ǫ =
1
N
N∑
w=1
f(w,mw) +
1
N
N∑
m=1
h(m,wm), (1)
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Fig. 1. Average energy of agents ǫ as a function of N in log-log scale. The dashed
line is obtained from eq. (3) and the solid line from eq. (2). Symbols correspond
to numerical calculations of the Ground State (circles), the OSS (squares) and the
FC State (triangles), averaged over 1000 repetitions. In the inset graph we plotted
their respective variances.
where mw is the husband of woman w and wm the wife of man m. Low energy
corresponds to high satisfaction and vice-versa.
There are many ways to match pairwise the 2N players for a given instance of
the preference lists, whether or not the notion of stability is taken into account
[8]. If we treat the Marriage Problem as an optimization problem, then we can
define the following relevant states:
• Ground State (state with the minimal total energy).
• Optimal Stable State (stable state with the minimal total energy).
The first one is globally optimal, the second is a constrained optimal state.
Both of them are rather unlikely to be found in real life, because of incomplete
information and limited searching power [9]. In particular men may not know
all the women and vice-versa, or they may not dare to divorce once they found
an acceptable partner. Following the lines traced in ref. [2] we propose a new
procedure, the First Choice, that allows a selfish agent to find a suitable part-
ner in a limited time. Here we shall mainly consider its symmetrical version,
i.e. we make no difference between the strategies of men and women.
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2.1 Ground State
Often referred to as Assignment Problem [17], the problem of finding the
matching of minimal energy in a bipartite graph has a long history in Op-
erations Research. It has been shown that, in an instance of size N of the
marriage problem, the Hungarian algorithm [18] finds the Ground State in
O(N3) steps. The average energy of the corresponding matching has been
calculated analytically in reference [16]:
ǫGS = 0.81
√
N. (2)
The above esteem (solid line) is compared with simulation data (circles) in
figure 1, with good agreement.
2.2 Optimal Stable State
The Stable Marriage Problem [10,11] describes a complex system where indi-
viduals attempt to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually con-
flicting constraints. A stable matching is defined by the property that there
are no two couples (m,w) and (m′, w′), such that h(m,w′) < h(m,w) and
f(w,m′) < f(w,m). The algorithm of Gale and Shapley [1] yields the stable
matching with minimal average men’s energy (male optimal). Starting from
the male optimal solution, all other stable matchings can be obtained by prop-
erly performing cyclic exchange processes called rotations. If one wanted to
find the stable matching that minimizes the total energy ǫ, one could thus
enumerate all stable matchings and compare their values. Unfortunately it
has been shown that the maximum and the average number of stable match-
ings, for an instance of size N of the preference lists, grow, respectively, as eN
[12] and as N log(N) [11,13]. In order to find a faster algorithm reference [14]
suggests to construct a weighted directed graph of all rotations. The authors
show that the maximum-weight closed subset of the rotation poset gives the
OSS. The algorithm they propose scales as N4, i.e. the running time of the
Ford-Fulkerson algorithm [15] to find a minimum cut in the graph.
Since in stable matchings the average male and female energies are found to
obey the relation ǫmǫf = N [16], in a sex-fair matching, such as the OSS, the
average energy per person must be
ǫOSS =
√
N. (3)
In figure 1 the above equation, plotted as a dashed line, is shown to fit well
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the simulation data we obtained for the OSS (squares) using the algorithm
described in [14].
2.3 First Choice
In the First Choice model (FC), at time step n every player proposes to the
nth of his/her preference list. Man m, for instance, will propose to woman w,
such that h(m,w) = n. If w is still unmarried, f(w,m) ≤ n and w receives
no better proposal at time step n, then she retains m’s one and they get
married. Marriages cannot be broken: married couples sit aside till the end
of the game. If there are conflicting proposals the couples with the lowest
energies are married first. When all the couples meeting this criteria at time
step n got married, bachelors propose the (n + 1)th of their preference lists,
and so forth. The game proceeds till everybody is married, reaching what we
shall call FC state. Since energy corresponds to number of proposals, the FC
state can be found in less than quadratic time.
The results of our extensive simulations, reported in fig. 1, show the gap be-
tween the three different ways of modeling agents’ behavior. The Ground State
corresponds to the state of maximum global satisfaction, but there is no rea-
son why selfish players should be able to find it by themselves, and not move
from it once reached. Only an external institution, a matchmaker, could help
people coordinate in such a profitable way. On the other hand, the OSS would
not change, once reached by rational players. Since there is no procedure to
reach it, though, the same rational players are much more likely to get trapped
in another stable state. The OSS is, then, the best matching perfect agents
could possibly obtain by self-searching. Numerical simulations of the FC state,
reported as triangles up in figure 1, show that the FC matching gives aver-
age energies slightly above those of the OSS, and the same holds for their
respective variances (inset graph). FC agents retain the best possibility they
encounter at a given time and do not need to process all the virtually infi-
nite information available. The same way consumers sometimes keep buying a
specific, satisficing, product, instead of spending their time and money trying
out all the other ones.
3 Individual energy distribution with complete information
We turn now our attention to single individuals, by tracing the individual
energy distribution for the three matching methods. That of the OSS can be
estimated following the same reasoning as in reference [13], where the authors
define the ensemble of all stable matchings. In our case we just have to add
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the symmetry constraint ǫf = ǫm. Using continuous variables and rescaling the
rankings such that xm ≃ h(m,wm)/N , X = ∑Ni=1 xi and yw ≃ f(w,mw)/N ,
Y =
∑N
j=1 yj , the probability of finding a symmetrical stable state reads:
P =
1∫
0
dNx
1∫
0
dNy
∏
i 6=j
(1− xiyj)δ(
∑
i
xi −
∑
j
yj)
≃
1∫
0
dNxe−X
2
ρ2N (X)
where [13]:
ρN (X) =
1∫
0
dNxδ(X −
N∑
i=1
xi) ≃ X
N−1
Γ(N)
(1− e−N/X)N . (4)
The single agent energy distribution can then be calculated by taking the
average of δ(x− xN) in the above ensemble, which reads:
< δ(x− xN ) >= 1
P
N∫
0
e−X
2
ρN−1(X − x)ρN (X) (5)
≃ (N − 1)(
√
N − x)N−2
N
N−1
2
→
√
Ne−x
√
N , (6)
for N ≫ x. In fact the integral in (5) can be solved with the saddle point
method around X =
√
N , where the factor (1 − e−N/X)N of equation (4) is
almost equal 1. Hence the distribution of the average player’s energy ǫi = Nx
equals
p(ǫi) =
1√
N
e
− ǫi√
N . (7)
The above becomes a simple exponential, if we rescale the ǫi variable as follows:
ǫ˜i =
ǫi√
N
. (8)
Equation (7), plotted as a solid line, agrees with the numerical simulations of
the OSS reported in fig. 2.b, while it lies below the fat tail of the individual
energy distribution of the FC State (fig. 2.a). Such a discrepancy is due to the
fact that FC marriages are unbreakable, so the unlucky players married as last
end up with energies comparable to that of a random choice (N/2). In real
6
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Fig. 2. Probability distribution of average individual energies ǫi, rescaled according
to equation eq. (8), in the First Choice (a), Optimal Stable (b) and Ground State (c),
plotted in linear-log scale. Symbols correspond to simulations obtained for different
values of N , as reported in the legends. The solid lines represent the analytical
solution for the OSS (equation (7)), the dashed line fits the data for the Ground
State.
life social relations are not static, but local rearrangements, such as divorces
or lay-offs, take place on a much longer time scale than that needed to find a
partner.
The distribution of Ground State energies obeys perfectly the scaling of equa-
tion (8) and is well fitted by the Gaussian-like distribution e−0.26ǫi(2+ǫi). This
suggests that the globally optimal solution tends to assign similar satisfactions
to every agent, balancing the loss of those who happen to be more “beauti-
ful” [19] in a given instance of the preference lists with the gain of the least
attractive ones. Such a fair and profitable matching, though, is prevented by
the individual selfishness of agents endowed with perfect information. In the
following sections we will show how things may change when individual infor-
mation is incomplete.
3.1 Evolutionary stability
The model becomes richer if we introduce a threshold value δ, corresponding to
the rank above which it is more convenient for an agent to remain unmarried
(or, similarly, not to buy a given product). In this situation one could wonder
if it would be a better strategy to go down quicker on one’s preference list, thus
lowering one’s probability of remaining single, or slower, in order to double
one’s chances of success with a better partner. Let us formalize this idea as
follows: in a population of normal people (who propose to one partner at each
7
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Fig. 3. Ratio between “fast” (“slow”) people’s energies and “normal” ones, as a
function of the percentage of “normal” agents β. Symbols are simulation data for a
200 agents system with different thresholds δ. Lines are inserted to guide the eyes.
time step) we can insert a percentage (1 − β) of “fast” (who propose to the
next two agents of their preference list) or “slow” ones (who only make one
proposal every two time steps). The game can thence be carried out as usual.
Some agents will remain single at an energy cost δ + 1.
In fig. 3 we report simulation data from this model. There we analyze the ratios
between the average energies of slow (fast) and normal people ǫslow(fast)/ǫnormal.
Both ratios remain bigger than one for any value of the percentage of normal
people β. This proves that, given agents do not seek the optimal but the
satisficing, it is always convenient to make only one proposal at each time
step. In other words, we could make different possible strategies compete by
Darwinian selection, giving each agent a number of offsprings proportional
to her satisfaction at every generation. No matter the percentage of people
holding a given strategy in the first generation, the FC one would always
spread and succeed. In a wide sense the First Choice model meets, therefore,
the requirements for evolutionary stability [20].
4 Partial information
Complete information is rare to be encountered in economic and social rela-
tions. Imperfect markets, where consumers do not even know the existence of
some products, are more frequent than ideal ones. The FC model can be gen-
eralized to the case of limited information, that is people only know a portion
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α of the world. Accordingly, every preference list will contain N(1−α) holes.
If people behaved according to the Gale-Shapley algorithm [1] the resulting
satisfactions would be those reported in reference [9]. In the FC case agents
propose, at time step n, to the nth ranked known counterpart player of their
lists. Man m could accept woman w’s proposal only if h(m,w) were smaller
or equal to the rank of the nth known woman of his list. For small values of α
some players find no partner and they remain single at an energy cost ∆c ≥ N .
It is evident that information matters: the more people one knows, the more
choice one has. It is then easy to state that ǫ must be a monotonically de-
creasing function of α. In order to quantify this dependence, we notice that
the average probability of accepting a proposal is of order ǫ/N . If a player
sent out n proposals before finding her partner, the total probability ǫ n
N
of
getting married must equal unity (in the absence of singles). Starting from
this observation we can follow the argument used in [2], which gives, in the
symmetric case,
ǫ =
√
N
α(2− α) . (9)
A similar, yet more precise esteem, can be found as follows.
4.1 Analytical estimation
The probability pn that an agent gets married exactly at time step n can be
written as
pn ≃ 2 n
αN
q2n−1, (10)
where qn is the probability of not being married and n/αN the average proba-
bility of accepting a proposal, at step n. In eq. (10), and in the following, we are
neglecting: (i)The probability of having two agents proposing to each other at
the same time. (ii)The probability of having two agents proposing to the same
partner at the same time. The latter becomes important for nmax = Nα ≃ 1.
The number of singles diminishes with increasing n according to the equation
qn = qn−1 − pn ≃ qn−1
(
1− 2 n
αN
qn−1
)
, (11)
which can be solved for α≪ 1, giving
qn =
(
1 +
n2
αN
)−1
. (12)
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Fig. 4. Simulations of the FC method at increasing α values, with ∆c = N + 1.
Circles (N = 128) and squares (N = 256) are the average energies of agents as a
function of α, in log− log scale. The solid line plots equation (13) for N = 256.
Inset: triangles up (N = 128) and asterisks (N = 256) are the percentage of singles,
displayed in log− log scale. The solid line plots qNα of equation (12) for N = 256.
This means there are going to be singles even at the end of the FC process,
i.e. for n = αN . We compared such qαN with numerical simulations in the
inset of figure 4, finding a good agreement. When α = 1 there are no singles,
and the exponential transition between the two regimes takes place around
α ≃ logN/N , which corresponds to the analogous cut-off found in marriages
with threshold [13].
Among the players who get married at time step n, half of them would be
proposers and their energy would scale as n/α; the other half would receive
a proposal uniformly distributed between 1 and n/α. Therefore the average
energy of these agents reads ǫn =
3n
4α
. Inserting equation (12) into (10), we can
calculate the average energy per agent as follows:
ǫ =
Nα∑
k=1
pkǫk ≃ 3π
8
N
√
Nα
1 +Nα
. (13)
The above equation is plotted against α in figure 4. Comparison with sim-
ulation data shows a better agreement for large α values than for smaller
ones. This is probably due to the above mentioned fact that the neglected
contribution of conflicting proposals becomes important when nmax = Nα is
small.
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Fig. 5. Simulations of the FC method at increasing α values, with N = 128. Circles
are the percentage of unhappy people pu, squares that of happy ones ph, at constant
increments ∆α = 1/N , plotted against α in semi-log scale. The inset highlights, in
linear scale, the last half decade of the graph.
4.2 Unhappy minority
As α increases, the average energy per person drops very quickly. Now we ask
ourselves how benefits are distributed in the population. In particular we shall
focus our attention on the agents who do not benefit at all from an information
increase. This kind of individual based analysis is crucial in economic systems,
where the average data is not the end of the story.
We can imagine a situation where agents are endowed with a knowledge α1,
find a FC matching M1 with average energy ǫ(α1), and then acquire an ad-
ditional amount of knowledge ∆α. This way players make new acquaintances
and may find a better partner than they used to. The resulting new match-
ing M2 would correspond to a different point in the plot of fig. 4, i.e. ǫ(α2),
where α2 = α1 + ∆α. The average energy decrease ǫ(α2) < ǫ(α1) is due to
the percentage ph(α) of the population that improves its condition. On the
other hand some players (Npu(α)) suffer the couples reshuffling from M1 to
M2, ending up with a higher energy.
We studied the percentage ph(α) of “happy” people and that of unhappy ones
pu(α), at constant α increments ∆α. In figure 5 we reported the results for
∆α = 1/N . Notice that, in this case, the derivative Du(α) = lim∆α→0 1N
pu(α)
∆α
if well estimated by pu(α) itself, when N goes to infinity. After a very short
transient phase where the number of singles increases for the joint effect of
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Fig. 6. Simulations of the FC method at fixed αm = 1 and increasing αw values, with
N = 128. The lower graph displays the average energy of agents (men, women and
both) as a function of αw, in semi-log scale. In the upper graph the corresponding
percentage of unhappy people (men, women and both), at constant increments
∆αw = 1/128, is plotted against the same log-scaled αw values.
competition and scarcity of alternatives, pu decreases logarithmically, and so
does ph. Notice that, even though the two percentages come closer as α is
increased, Dh(α) stays always above Du(α), as shown in the inset of figure 5.
4.3 Asymmetric information
We have shown so far that information enhances the general satisfaction and
damages slightly only a small minority of the population. Let us now give
complete information to one side, say men (αm = 1), and vary the other
group’s one (αw ∈ (0, 1]). A similar situation occurs in economics when, for
instance, firms have a much better knowledge of the market, that is their core
business, than consumers do. Potential buyers, on the other hand, may increase
considerably their amount of information by gathering sellers’ reputation data,
which becomes easily feasible in the Internet age [6].
In figure 6.a we plotted the probability of being unhappy pu(αw), with the
same definition as before, for men, women and both. The behavior is very
similar to the symmetric case. As expected, there are more men than women
suffering from the unilateral injection of information in the game. Here men
are justly paying the price of equal rights.
In figure 6.b the corresponding energies of both sexes are plotted against αw
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in semi-log scale. It appears clearly that women’s energy (squares) decreases
while men’s energy (diamonds) increases, as αw grows. Then men’s satisfaction
deteriorates, even if their information does not change during the process.
Nevertheless the general average energy, represented by open circles in figure
6, diminishes. In other words men’s loss is more than compensated by women’s
improvement: even a unilateral information increase is beneficial to the society
as a whole. This confirms the pie augmentation hypothesis made in [2].
5 Matchmaker
When information is only partial players score very poorly (see fig. 4). In
some circumstances it could be convenient for them to let someone else find
them a partner, rather than doing it by themselves. This becomes possible
–and even likely– in a world where the connectivity distribution of human
social contacts is very broad [21]. More than that, in the Internet age very few
highly connected nodes [22] could gather a huge amount of information.
Let us imagine that people in a community agree to give their preferences
lists to a matchmaker (MM)[2]. He possess now complete information and is
capable of finding the Ground State of the system. Accordingly, he proposes
each player a partner: if everybody accepted the MM’s proposal, then the
community would minimize the total energy. Nevertheless we assume players
are selfish and careless of the general welfare. Thus they keep looking for a
better partner among those players whom they know, employing their maxi-
mum searching effort. If a man m and a woman w prefer to marry one another
rather than accepting the MM’s offer, then they refuse it, step out of the com-
munity and get married. Such a decision forces in the meantime two more
players (m’s and w’s partners in the Ground State) to look for a new partner.
For each value of α there would be a percentage pi(α) of such “independent”
people.
A rough esteem of pi can be obtained by calculating the probability that an
individual FC energy is lower than that of the Ground State. To do that,
we shall assume that the distribution of individual energies in the FC state
pFC(x, α) equals that of the OSS (eq. (7)) for α = 1, and that pFC(x, 1)dx =
pFC(x/
√
α, α)dx/
√
α. These approximations are only reasonable when α ≫
αc. If we take equation (2) for the individual energy distribution in the Ground
State, we obtain:
pi(α) ∝

√α
√
N∫
0
dxe−x
x∫
0
dye−0.3y(2+y)


2
≃ 0.2α, (14)
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Fig. 7. Simulation data of a Marriage game with N = 128 players for each gender.
Averages are taken over 104 realizations for each value of α, whose x-axis linear
scale is the same for all graphs. (a)Circles represent the percentage pi of indepen-
dent people. The solid line plots equation (14). (b)Squares represent the overall
average energy per person ǫ. The dotted line is the value of the Ground State en-
ergy, corresponding to pi = 0, the dashed line that of the FC energy.
for N approaching to infinity. In figure 7.a equation (14) is compared with
simulations, and the agreement seems good.
In figure 7.b the overall average energy per person ǫ is plotted against α.
Its lower and upper bounds should respectively be the Ground State energy
(displayed as dotted line) and the FC one (displayed as dashed line). It is
clearly not the case for the latter, because half of the independent couples
are rematched randomly, having been forced to divorce by their mates. The
crossing point (around α = 0.72) corresponds, in the graph 7.a, to a critical
percentage of independent people. Above that value (about 2%) the MM can
no more be useful, unless he employed sophisticated mechanisms. For instance
he could find the matching of minimal energy among the “loyal” people; but
this could become an endless process, since it would generate a new cascade
of desertions, and so forth.
For sure, at least below that critical value, ǫ is a monotonically increasing
function of α. This means that people with partial information (small α) can
score better than those with infinite searching power (α = 1), given that they
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renounce to their personal privacy. This effect would be amplified by the fact
that some of them would find the MM’s offer satisficing, and not search any
further for a different partner. In other words what we are showing in fig. 7.b
is the worst case of anti-social behavior at any given average information level.
In real life very few people would employ all their searching effort looking for a
substitute good (partners might be an exception) if they were satisfied enough
with the one they already have [4]. This way most of the people will remain
in the MM’s community, thus saving searching costs and being better off on
average. Such savings can be thought of as the MM’s revenue. The above
argument becomes more effective if we imagine that the game be repeated
numerous times, in which case reputation matters [6]. Then people would
care more about their average utility and might be pleased by a long lasting
confidence relationship with the MM.
Of course we should consider the possibility of a corrupted MM, who would
favor some players at the expense of the collectivity. However, the matchmaker
institution would survive only if the average energy of those who accept his
proposals is lower than that of those who found a partner on their own. More-
over, when the information that players release to the MM is not used properly,
it would start to be convenient for them to protect their privacy. In such a
situation it’s no more profitable for the MM to be corrupted and an equilib-
rium is likely to arise. By construction, at the equilibrium point the average
satisfaction is bigger than it would be without the MM, and more evenly dis-
tributed (the variance of the Ground State distribution, plotted in the inset
of fig. 1, is the smallest). Furthermore, we should consider competition among
different MMs, in which case a cheating one would be exposed to the danger
of loosing clients and lower his earnings.
6 Market implications
A real market could be thought of as a polygamic marriage game with unequal
number of players. In order to point out the role of information, we can try to
carry on this metaphor letting rational agents with partial information play
the game.
Let us consider a market with Nc consumers and n enterprises, such that
n ≪ Nc, where every enterprise produces the same type of good. Enterprises
have a completely degenerate preference list, i.e. they make no discrimination
among different consumers. Each enterprise i is endowed with a budget equal
to 1, a fraction (1 − qi) of which will be invested in the marketing process, a
fraction qi in the quality of the product. Here “quality” includes the research
expenditures and the costs of production. Consumers act as in the FC model.
They get to know the different brands through commercials, plus an effort
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ek ∈ (0, 1), which represents the amount of personal search. ek = 1 corresponds
to disposing of and processing infinite information, ek = 0 to no information
effort. The probability αk(i) that consumer k knows the product i should be
a convex function of (1− qi); for the sake of simplicity, let us assume it linear:
αk(i) = min{1, 1− qi + ek}. (15)
On the other hand, for consumer k the product i has an expected utility
uk(i) = qi + ηk(1− qi), (16)
where ηk is a random variable, uniformly distributed between zero and one.
This way consumers have a perception of the quality of the goods(qi), but
commercials (1−qi) are aimed to confuse them, so that the products look nicer
than they really are. In fact information is not only limited in real life, but it is
also imperfect [2,6]. The factor ηk is intended to account for commercials more
or less effective, for different tastes and needs of consumers. Higher expected
utility corresponds to better ranking in one’s preference list. This approach
resembles the “beauty correlated” marriage problem, studied in a recent paper
[19]. All products have the same price, but different qualities.
At each instance of the game consumers buy one unit of good. In order to
maximize their expected utility, they choose the best ranked among those they
know of. As a first, simple example, let us set up a game with the variables qi
randomly distributed between zero and one. Each consumer knows an average
of r(e) = n(1 + 2e)/2 different products if the average effort e is smaller
than 0.5, n products otherwise. Consumers’ average utility is a monotonically
increasing function of e and n. Now we introduce a new enterprise and ask
ourselves the q value qˆ that maximizes its selling. With some approximation
we can show that the probability of being the best ranked, among the r(e)
that each consumer knows, has the form pbest(q, r) ≃ (1−qr−1)(1−q)r . Multiplying pbest
and αk(i) (eq. 15) we find the average selling of the new enterprise:
s(q, e) = Nc(1− q + e)(1− q
n 1+2e
2
−1)
(1− q)n1+2e
2
(17)
For e < 0.5 we can assume r ≃ n/2. With this position we find that the
maximum of the above equation lies on the curve
e(qˆ) =
(n− 2)(1− qˆ)2qˆn/2
2qˆ2 + qˆn/2[qˆ(n− qˆ) + 2− n] ,
that is a monotonically increasing function of qˆ. This means that, as expected,
the optimal fraction of quality investment qˆ increases as the consumers’ effort
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Fig. 8. Probability of selling an item as a function of the quality investment q.
The plots represent eq. (17), with n = 10, for three different values of the average
consumers’ effort e. Filled points are the maxima qˆ of the curves for e = 0.1 and
e = 0.3. For e = 0.51 s is an increasing function of q, therefore qˆ = 1.
grows (see fig. 8). In other words, the bigger portion of the market consumers
know, the more enterprises are likely to invest in the quality of the product.
Moreover, the amount of effort needed to make it convenient to the new enter-
prise to invest all its capital in the quality, e(qˆ = 1) = 4
n−4 , diminishes sensibly
with increasing n. Similar arguments hold for e > 0.5.
At a given value of the consumers’ effort e, some enterprises would adjust
their q investment to exploit the edge left by the other ones. But how do
consumers decide their searching effort level? Increased computing power may
allow for increasing information capability with no additional cost. Still, some
information is costly [23]. One way to take care of it is subtracting the search
costs to the expected utility. In this more realistic case consumers may decide
how much they want to invest in searching a good, given the average quality of
the products. In the scenario we pictured above, they would probably search
until they are satisfied, without necessarily maximizing their utility function.
In fact, what is a core business for an enterprise is a marginal one for most
consumers. For this reason, even if some enterprises had a perfect knowledge
of the market and could find their qˆ at any time, it would always be convenient
for them to chose a lower level of quality investment.
17
7 Acknowledgments
We would like to thank A. Capocci and Joseph Wakeling for useful comments.
This work was supported by the Swiss National Fund, Grant No. 20-61470.00.
References
[1] D. Gale and L.S. Shapley L.S., Am. Math. Monthly, 69 (1962) 9.
[2] Y.C. Zhang, Physica A, 299 (2001) 104.
[3] J. Nash, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 36, 48 (1950).
[4] H. Simon ”Theories of Bounded Rationaliuty.” In, Models of Bounded
Rationality. Behavioral Economics and Business Organization. Pp. 408-423.
Vol. 2. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982.
[5] G.A. Akerlof, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (1970) 488.
[6] P. Laureti, F. Slanina, Y.-K. Yu, Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A, 316 (2002) 413.
[7] T.C. Schelling, Micro Motives and Macro Behavior. New York, W.W. Norton
& Company, 1978
[8] B. Pittel, Ann.Appl.Prob., 2 (1992) 358.
[9] G. Caldarelli, A. Capocci, P. Laureti, Physica A, 299 (2001) 268.
[10] D.E. Knuth, Mariages Stables. Les Presses de l’Universite´ de Montre´al,
Montre´al, 1976.
[11] D. Gusfield, R.W. Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and
Algorithms. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
[12] R. W. Irving, P. Leather, SIAM J. Comput., 15 (1986) 655.
[13] M. Dzierzawa and M.J. Ome´ro, Physica A, 287 (2000) 321.
[14] R. W. Irving, P. Leather, and D. Gusfield, Journal of the ACM, 34 (1987) 532.
[15] D. Sleator, R.E. Tarjan, J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 26 (1983) 362.
[16] M.-J. Omero, M. Dzierzawa, M. Marsili and Y.-C. Zhang, J. Physique I France,
7 (1997) 1723.
[17] C. H. Papadimitriou and K. Steiglitz. Combinatorial Optimization: Algorithms
and Complexity. Prentice-Hall, 1982.
[18] H.W. Kuhn, Nav. Res. Logist. Quart., 2 (1955) 83.
[19] G. Caldarelli, A. Capocci, Physica A, 300 (2001) 325.
18
[20] G. M. Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, Paperback (1982)
[21] F. Liljeros, C.R. Edling, L.A.N. Amaral, H.E. Stanley, Y. Aberg, Nature 411
(2001) 907.
[22] C. Faloutsos, P. Faloutsos, M. Faloutsos, In Preceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM
September 1999.
[23] G. Stigler, Journal of Political Economy, 69, (1961) 213.
19
